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ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRN-C Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi
CDC Constitutional Drafting Committee
CIL Country Insights Lab
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DP Democrat Party
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ISL Institute for Societal Leadership
NCPO National Council for Peace and Order
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PAD People’s Alliance for Democracy
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III. About the Country Insights Lab Series 
The Institute for Societal Leadership conducted a series of eleven Country Insights 
Labs (CILs) in select Southeast Asian cities between June 2014 and June 2015. 
Each CIL aimed to uncover the critical social and environmental issues facing 
leaders from business, government and civil society in a given country and frame 
the underlying causes behind each issue within the country’s context. The study 
identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and has since directed further re-
search toward interconnected social and environmental issues shared among 
countries in the region. 
Additionally, ISL research staff investigated the day-to-day organisational chal-
lenges faced by social impact organisations (SIOs) in each Southeast Asian coun-
try. We broadly defined an SIO as any organisation with the capacity to contribute 
to the betterment of communities. These included, but were not limited to, phil-
anthropic organisations, corporate foundations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), activist groups, social enterprises and impact investors. Interviews fo-
cussed on challenges associated with funding models, human resources, tax in-
centives, legal frameworks and government registration processes. In total, re-
search staff interviewed 237 organisations and 293 individuals, including govern-
ment officials, business leaders, philanthropists, NGO workers, social entrepre-
neurs, media professionals and academics. The interviews themselves consisted of 
questions relating to organisational history, operations, strategic outlook, cross-
sector collaboration, leadership and country context.  1
The Institute did not intend the CIL series to be exhaustive or to produce statisti-
cally significant data. On the contrary, the series was a qualitative study that em-
ployed interviews and market insights as a means of understanding an increasing-
ly complex landscape. As one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of devel-
opment. At the cornerstone of each country study is a belief that workable solu-
tions and partnerships depend on an awareness of how each country’s unique 
context relates to its social issues. 
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Chiang Mai on 19 January 2015 
and in Bangkok between 20–21 January and 10–13 March 2015. 
 For a list of sample questions, see section VI. 1
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IV. Thailand  
A. Historical Background 
Thai migrants first began trickling into the Chao 
Phraya river valley from Southern China in the 
eleventh century. Thai chieftains established petty 
kingdoms in modern-day Myanmar, Thailand and 
Laos, initially as tributaries to more established 
Burmese and Khmer rulers. However, both the 
diminishing influence of the Khmer Empire and 
the Mongols’ sacking of the Burmese capital 
Bagan in 1287 left a political vacuum in mainland 
Southeast Asia, which was soon filled by Thai 
kingdoms such as Sukhothai (1238–1463), Chiang 
Mai (1296–1775), Ayutthaya (1351–1767) and 
eventually Bangkok (f. 1 
782). In the process, the up-and-coming Thai poli-
ties supplanted the Khmer Empire as the domi-
nant power on the mainland, but they also largely 
absorbed cultural cues from the sophisticated 
Mon and Khmer peoples, including their writing 
systems, legal codes, art forms, political and ad-
ministrative structures and the Theravada Bud-
dhist religion. 
Thailand stands apart from all other Southeast 
Asian countries as the only local power never 
colonised by Europeans in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. To a limited extent, this 
was a direct result of intra-European geopolitics. 
The Kingdom of Siam functioned as a neutral buf-
fer state between French Indochina and British 
interests in Burma and Malaya. Nevertheless, the 
country’s two reformist monarchs, Mongkut (r. 
1851–1868) and his son Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–
1910), were responsible for launching policies 
that ensured Siam’s continued independence and 
political relevance. Mongkut and Chulalongkorn 
skilfully prevented any single foreign interest from 
exercising undue influence on Thai soil by arrang-
ing trade treaties with as many Western delega-
tions as possible. They also sent Thai aristocrats 
abroad to attend European institutions and mod-
ernised Siam’s infrastructure, military and adminis-
trative apparatus. By 1940, the kingdom pos-
sessed state-of-the-art roads, canals, railways, 
shipyards, hospitals, primary and secondary 
schools, a facility for the study of foreign lan-
guages, a military academy and two universities.   2
Modernist reforms in the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth centuries gave birth to a pro-
fessional Bangkok-based bureaucratic and mili-
tary elite that continues to exert enormous influ-
ence on Thai political, business and cultural pur-
suits today. In 1932, elements from both the mili-
tary and bureaucracy, frustrated with an ossifying 
monarchy, staged a bloodless coup and penned 
the country’s first constitution. Thai politics ever 
since have involved a volatile cocktail of bureau-
cratic elites, military strongmen, big business in-
terests, rural politicians tied to provincial patron-
age systems and factions controlled by ambitious 
royals. Modern Thailand has experienced twelve 
successful coup d’etats, seven failed coup at-
tempts and eighteen constitutions. King Bhumi-
bol Adulyadej (r. 1946–) remains the sole constant 
and unifying force. Although the king has few 
nominal powers, he has successfully intervened 
on several occasions to reign in the military and 
other factions. 
The 1997 financial crisis has significantly coloured 
Thai politics for the last two decades. Throughout 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, increased access 
to global markets and a steady stream of cheap 
foreign credit fuelled annual growth rates reach-
ing into the double-digits, but the bubble 
popped when market elasticity ran out, export 
prices plummeted and the government was 
forced to float the baht. By the end of 1998, thou-
sands of Thai businesses had gone bankrupt and 
the economy had contracted more than 11 per-
cent.  The Democrat Party (DP), supported pri3 -
marily by Bangkok’s middle class, attempted to 
limit future speculation by pushing through a new 
constitution in 1997 with provisions for strength-
ened liberal institutions, but the collapse of the 
Thai economy at the hands of foreign creditors 
 D. R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia: Past & Present, Fifth Edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 139.2
 “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank, accessed 1 June 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/.3
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also brought Thailand’s native business conglom-
erates into the political ring to push for protec-
tionist policies.  
Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT), 
initially funded by such big business money, rode 
to overwhelming electoral success in 2001. 
Thaksin was especially effective in the northern 
and eastern districts, attracting rural voters with 
promises of instituting business-friendly policies 
that would raise incomes in these typically poor 
regions. Traditionally, local politicians would win 
the votes of rural constituents by promising kick-
backs and pork barrel, but Thaksin achieved un-
precedented voter loyalty by assuring poor farm-
ers that TRT would become their primary source 
of subsidies, cheap health care and low-interest 
government-backed loans.  By 2005, his populist 4
politics had lost him the support of the business 
elite, but he nonetheless rode to a victorious sec-
ond term on the shoulders of a newly-built politi-
cal machine that had mobilised Thailand’s rural 
electorate at an unprecedented scale.  
The Thai government’s social and developmental 
policies for the last decade have turned on the 
widening political differences between Bangkok’s 
established power brokers and the newly-awak-
ened rural electorate. The military, one of several 
traditional power bases, ousted Thaksin in a 2006 
coup following several high-profile scandals. 
Protests and counter protests staged by the large-
ly middle-class anti-Thaksin People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD), or “yellow shirts,” and the work-
ing class pro-Thaksin National United Front of 
Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or “red 
shirts,” have dominated international headlines 
ever since his removal. Demonstrations erupted 
in 2008 and 2010, and following that, at various 
junctures during the tenure of five Prime Ministers 
including PM Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, 
who took office from 2011 - 2014. On 20 May 
2014, following seven months of anti-govern-
ments protests, the military declared martial law 
and established the National Council for Peace 
and Order (NCPO). General Prayut Chan-o-cha 
  Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), 188.4
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Thailand By Numbers
Surface Area: 
513,120 sq km
Population:
66.78 million [2012]
Population Density:
130.2 per sq km
Population of Bangkok:
8.43 million [2011]
Urban Population:
34.8% [2013]
Currency:
Thai Baht (THB)
GDP (Nominal):
US$385.69 billion [2012]
Growth Rate:
6.4% [2012]
GDP Per Capita:
US$5,775.20 [2012]
Unemployment:
0.7% [2012]
Tourist Arrivals Annually:
22.35 million [2012]
Mobile-Cellular Subscriptions:
120.3 per 100 inhabitants [2012]
Individuals Using Internet:
26.5% [2012]
Life Expectancy at Birth:
Females (77.7 years); Males (71.0 years)
Forested Area:
37.2% [2011]
Source: UN Data (http://data.un.org)
assumed the position of acting Prime Minister two 
days later. 
Both the DP and the current military administra-
tion are anxious to rewrite the constitution in or-
der to prevent pro-Thaksin factions from dominat-
ing future polls. Following court orders dissolving 
it, the TRT has reconstituted itself as the People’s 
Power Party and currently the Pheu Thai Party 
(PTP). Pro-Thaksin politicians, including Somchai 
Wongsawrt and Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawa-
tra, have won every national election since 2001. 
To counter the Thaksin political machine, the cur-
rent junta has appointed a Constitutional Drafting 
Committee (CDC) to create a new constitution 
that will restore “democracy appropriate to Thai 
society.”  Above all, there are fears among DP 5
members that the ailing king’s death will enable 
Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, who is close 
to Thaksin, to issue a pardon and return the popu-
lar politician to Bangkok from his self-imposed 
exile in Dubai. 
As of this writing, there are still a number of un-
knowns in Thailand’s political and economic fu-
ture. Although Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha 
lifted martial law in March 2015, he continues to 
wield power through Article 44 of the interim 
constitution and has postponed elections to Sep-
tember 2016. Meanwhile, Thailand’s economy 
grew a paltry 0.7 percent in 2014 and political 
enemies are increasingly prosecuted under the 
kingdom’s strict lèse-majesté law.  Former Prime 6
Minister Yingluck is on trial for civil and criminal 
charges and faces heavy backlash from a botched 
rice-pledging scheme launched in 2013. Al-
though Thaksin has urged his followers to remain 
calm, the CDC’s proposals could spark further 
protests originating from the “red shirt” camp. 
B.Current Challenges 
❖ There are many NGOs in Thailand but few 
businesses concerned with CSR . Thailand has 
one of Southeast Asia’s most vibrant civil society 
spaces, but grassroots organisations have strug-
gled to maintain political neutrality. During mili-
tary rule in the 1960s and 1970s, the government 
viewed civil society organisations (CSOs) as po-
tential havens for Marxist resistance and imposed 
measures that restricted such groups from operat-
ing.  However, laxer regulations in subsequent 7
decades led to an explosion of CSOs. By 1989, 
Thailand had over 12,000 local non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs).  8
Thai businesses in general have less developed 
CSR practices than their counterparts from other 
parts of Asia.  Thai companies have traditionally 9
made charitable donations to religious or educa-
tional institutions, but there are few local firms 
practising CSR that aims to generate systemic 
change or solve social and environmental chal-
lenges. CSR activities are generally confined to 
employee volunteerism and community service, 
and only a few corporations have attempted to 
apply global-class sustainability and fair trade 
standards to their supply chains or industrial pro-
cesses. Better CSR will require brainstorming with 
civil society leaders who have firsthand knowl-
edge of social and environmental issues as well as 
leveraging company resources to invent novel 
methods for confronting such issues. 
❖  Political violence and separatist movements in 
the deep south. Thailand’s southernmost prov-
inces, including Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, 
have experienced intermittent separatist activity 
since the 1960s, but Thaksin Shinawatra’s  
 Ibid., 25.5
 “World Development Indicators.”6
 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2009), 13.7
 “Civil Society Briefs: Thailand,” Asian Development Bank, accessed 15 June 2015, http://www.adb.org/publications/civil-society-briefs-8
thailand.
 Corporate Social Responsibility in Thailand (Bangkok: Asian Institute of Technology, 2011),  4.9
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attempts to sideline political opponents in the re-
gion has stirred an unprecedented level of political 
violence since 2004. The three provinces are home 
to 1.8 million Muslim ethnic-Malays, who are cul-
turally, linguistically and religiously distinct from 
the majority Thai population.  As a nominally 10
Buddhist monarchy dedicated to “king, country 
and religion,” the Thai polity makes no acknowl-
edgement of cultural or religious minorities. Pro-
vincial governors are appointed by the Ministry of 
the Interior and are invariably Thai-speaking Bud-
dhists. Instruction in local government schools in 
the deep south is also exclusively in Thai. 
In an attempt to transfer power from the army to 
the police, Thaksin dissolved the military-domi-
nated Southern Border Provinces Administrative 
Center (SBPAC) in 2004. The SBPAC had coordi-
nated with local Islamic groups and dispensed 
salaries to religious and community leaders, but 
with their payouts cut off and no clear indication 
from the government that it was willing to devolve 
local power to Thai-Malay Muslims, militant or-
ganisations renewed separatist activity. Both the 
Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C) and 
the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) 
have raided police and military outposts, deto-
nated improvised explosive devices in civilian 
areas and assassinated Muslim community lead-
ers seen to be cooperating with the authorities. 
Between 2004 and 2012, roughly 6,000 people 
died in the conflict, half of whom were civilians 
with no links to either the Thai government or 
militant groups.  Human rights violations, includ11 -
ing the use of child soldiers and targeting of civil-
ians, have occurred on both sides. Under the 
2005 emergency decree for the region, authori-
ties can hold suspects without court warrant for 
up to 30 days. Local CSOs have reported several 
cases of torture by the army and police.  In Oc12 -
tober 2004, 78 protesters at Tak Bai died of suffo-
cation while in army custody. 
Unlike other Southeast Asian conflict zones, such 
as Mindanao, socio-economic grievances play 
little role in the rhetoric of militant groups in and 
around the deep south. The Thai government will 
need to formulate a purely political solution to the 
ongoing violence. Local Thai-Malay civil society 
groups in particular can play a constructive role in 
articulating desires for increased autonomy and 
cultural recognition in a peaceful manner while 
preventing youth from joining violent organisa-
tions. Retired militants attending peace talks facili-
tated by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur have called for 
active participation of local CSOs in negotiations. 
Since 2011, the Civil Society Council of South-
ernmost Thailand, a coalition of more than twenty 
local CSOs, has conducted surveys of southern 
communities and made recommendations for 
increased decentralisation, including local elec-
tion of governors. However, in order for the 
Council to be successful, it will need buy-in and 
acknowledgment from the government. 
❖ Lack of a comprehensive government pro-
gramme to combat regional human trafficking 
organisations. The U.S. State Department’s 2014 
Trafficking in Persons Report recently demoted 
Thailand to the lowest “tier three” rating. During 
the four consecutive years that it was on the “tier 
two” watch list, the Thai government consistently 
failed to address international concerns about 
Thailand’s domestic sex industry and fisheries. 
Thai officials were found to be complicit in the 
smuggling of migrants from neighbouring Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia. Men from Thailand, 
Myanmar and Cambodia were at times sold to 
Thai fishing vessels, where they were forced to 
work 18 to 20-hour days, threatened with depor-
tation and beaten. As much as 17 percent of Thai 
fishery employees reported forced work condi-
tions.  The report also found that Thai police offi13 -
cers were involved in protecting and frequenting 
brothels, massage parlours and other venues that 
were trafficking women and children. 
 Duncan McCargo, Southern Thailand: From Conflict to Negotiations? (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014), 3.10
 Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012), 4.11
 Ibid., 12.12
 Trafficking in Persons Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, June 2014), 373.13
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In 2013, a series of Pulitzer prize-winning inves-
tigative reports released by Reuters revealed the 
involvement of members of the Royal Thai Navy 
and immigration officials in the sale of Rohingya 
migrants from Myanmar to Thai fishing captains.  14
The government recently cracked down on illegal 
detention centres in the country’s south in May 
2015, but it failed to organise a concerted and 
compassionate response to large numbers of 
undocumented Myanmar and Bangladeshi mi-
grants  stranded off its shores. Migrants often 
cross through Thailand en route to find work in 
Malaysia.  
❖ Marginalised ethnic minorities and a persistent 
drug trade. Once a major opium producer in the 
1970s, Thailand has effectively curbed cultivation 
of poppies through a mixture of livelihood train-
ings programmes, construction of infrastructure in 
hill regions and crop replacement initiatives.  15
However, its porous borders with Myanmar and 
Laos are still key transit points for heroin and 
methamphetamines. In remote hill tribe areas in 
particular, shared ethnicity with smugglers in 
neighbouring countries combined with a lack of 
local educational or economic opportunities has 
lured significant numbers of youth from Akha, 
Hmong, Htin and Yao Hill Tribes into drug traffick-
ing.   
ISL staff interviewed organisations working with 
ethnic Hmong living in and around Chiang Mai. 
The Hmong are an ethnic group from the moun-
tainous regions of China, Vietnam, Laos and Thai-
land. It is estimated that there are approximately 
150,000 Hmong residing in Thailand. Thai-Hmong 
face several societal problems. One in four youth 
are involved in drug consumption and/or traffick-
ing because their remoteness of their villages 
allows for few other economic opportunities.  16
Hmong youth do not have access to adequate 
education, largely because government teachers 
are frequently absent.  
C. Insights from the Thailand Labs 
❖ Thai civil society as well as government-spon-
sored development initiatives are becoming in-
creasingly politicised in the post-Thaksin envi-
ronment. 
Civil society groups have not been immune to the 
increasing politicisation of Thai society in the post-
Thaksin era. The relatively permissive environ-
ment of the 1990s prior to the crisis had allowed 
for the formation of two distinct groups of CSOs, 
which today espouse two very different philoso-
phies of development. The first group, made up 
primarily of urban activists, initially lobbied for 
increased rule of law, transparency and liberal 
institutions that provided checks against execu-
tive power. The second group consisted of grass-
roots organisations representing rural farmers 
that protested bread-and-butter issues such as 
access to water and falling crop prices.  Mem17 -
bers of the former group have tended to support 
DP candidates and policies, participate in anti-
Thaksin “yellow shirt” protests and support an 
overhaul of the current constitution. The latter 
groups formed the basis of many pro-Thaksin “red 
shirt” organisations and are staunch supporters of 
PTP rural development programmes. 
Rural activism and support for government sub-
sidy programmes largely stems from Thailand’s 
vastly unequal distribution of wealth. Thailand’s 
poor are concentrated in provinces in the north 
and east, which also double as “red shirt” strong-
holds. Average incomes in these regions are up to 
60 percent less than commensurate salaries in the 
capital.  In a Keynesian-style bid to stimulate 18
 Jason Szep and Andrew R. C. Marshall, “Special Report: Thailand secretly supplies Myanmar refugees to trafficking rings,” Reuters, 4 De14 -
cember 2013.
 James Windle, “Drugs and Drug Policy in Thailand,” Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016 (Wash15 -
ington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2015), 8.
 Interview with RADION International, Chiang Mai, 19 January 2015.16
 Ibid., 18–19.17
 A Coup Ordained? Thailand’s Prospects for Stability, 6–7.18
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rural growth after his election in 2001, Thaksin 
established government funds that provided mi-
crocredit to farmers and launched a sweeping 
infrastructure overhaul in the countryside. His 
government programmes also subsumed many of 
the functions of the latter group of CSOs. “Red 
shirt” activism post-Thaksin has largely consisted 
of securing government subsidies and cash stim-
ulus in lieu of development programmes funded 
by donors. Although they remain popular in the 
countryside, some of these programmes have 
gone terribly wrong. Former Prime Minister 
Yingluck currently faces criminal charges for a 
controversial rice subsidy scheme that bought 
rice from farmers at above market rates. Govern-
ment losses were estimated at THB 600 billion (US
$18 billion).   19
In place of large-scale fiscal stimulation and gov-
ernment subsidies, the DP and the royal family 
have favoured small-scale development pro-
grammes that promote sustainability, self-suffi-
ciency and livelihood training for rural communi-
ties. After the 1997 crisis, King Bhumibol began to 
espouse a philosophy of “sufficiency eco-
nomy” (settakit po piang) that emphasised tradi-
tional piety and moderation. Rural initiatives cre-
ated by the Royal Projects Foundation and the 
Mae Fah Luang Foundation have tended towards 
teaching rural communities sustainable agricul-
tural methods, crafts and (most recently) social 
enterprise. The DP government of Abhisit Vejjaji-
va also established a Thai Social Enterprise Office 
to provide funding and training to social busi-
nesses in 2010. However, it is not clear if these 
small-scale programmes, which have typically 
favoured moralising over economic performance, 
can meet the aspirations of rural farmers. Few 
farmers graduating from Royal Projects pro-
grammes have adopted their techniques, and the 
above initiatives are largely the purview of the 
Bangkok-based middle class.   20
❖ Young middle-class Thais are increasingly 
drawn to careers in the social sector, but few have 
a concrete grasp of the needs and aspirations of 
their nation’s poor. 
In recent years, higher standards of living and 
changing social norms have made it increasingly 
popular for young Thais to pursue riskier careers 
at CSOs, social enterprises or impact investment 
firms. According to one interviewee, current ter-
tiary students and young professionals are look-
ing for purpose above pay. In 2014, Thammasat 
University tapped into this demand when it estab-
lished a “Global Studies and Social Entrepreneur-
ship” degree. Students enrolled in the pro-
gramme learn human-centred design principles, 
problem recognition, design thinking, business 
planning and financial management. 
According to a professor interviewed, one of the 
chief challenges the programme faces is the se-
vere cultural disconnect between urban students 
and the rural poor they aim to assist. Students in 
the programme are invariably privileged children 
of the middle-class or political elites. As discussed 
above, social enterprise and sustainability initia-
tives that patronise rural farmers can backfire and 
fail to achieve the key objective of raising stan-
dards of living in remote areas or among margin-
alised groups. In spite of well-developed problem 
solving skills and business acumen, middle-class 
urban development professionals face a high risk 
of misinterpreting the needs of rural residents. 
❖ Social enterprises face significant challenges in 
finding investors because they are seen as too 
high risk, even by impact investment funds. 
Impact investors in particular have been notably 
wary of using their money to finance social enter-
prises without the assurance of low-risk returns. 
Several organisations interviewed reported con-
sultations with various impact investment funds, 
only to be turned down because the fund 
deemed their business too high risk. Some of 
these organisations had graduated from incuba-
tor and accelerator programmes that were sup-
posed to have primed them for investment. 
 James Hookway, “Former Thai Leader Yingluck Shinawatra Charged in Rice-Subsidy Case,” The Wall Street Journal, 19 February 2015.19
Amalia Rossi, “Turning Red Rural Landscapes Yellow? Sufficiency Economy and Royal Projects in the Hills of nan Province, Northern Thai20 -
land,” ASEAS - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies 5.2 (2012), 281.
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Where impact investors have decided to put 
money into organisations, they have primarily 
employed debt vehicles that minimise risk. Most 
impact investment investors have aimed to fund 
organisations with US$50,000-500,000 packages. 
However, most startups are only looking for US
$20,000–50,0000.  
It should also be noted that several social enter-
prises interviewed found the social impact as-
sessments used by impact investors to measure 
social return on investment (SROI) of limited use. 
To date, no firm has developed a rigorous and 
scientific system of conducting SROI measure-
ments. Social entrepreneurs interviewed re-
marked that SROI ratings simply do not attract 
socially-conscious investors as promised.  
Like potential investors, consumers typically do 
not concern themselves with whether the social 
enterprise delivers on the social cause it was set 
up for. They purchase products or services from 
the social enterprise because of the perceived 
value they get from what is being sold. As such, a 
social enterprise is in fact competing in the same 
marketplace as regular businesses. This differen-
tiates Thailand from other Southeast Asian 
economies, such as the Philippines, where social-
ly-conscious consumption has become a signifi-
cant trend. 
❖ Lack of business management skills and clarity 
on social impact is stifling growth in the social 
sector.  
For-profit investors currently have a hard time 
understanding the potential of the social enter-
prises they are keen on supporting. This is largely 
caused by the fact that many social enterprises do 
not have proper book-keeping practices and lack 
the know-how to appropriately value their organi-
sations. Founders of social enterprises tend to 
prioritise the social aspects of their work, often 
neglecting the business management aspect that 
is actually necessary to grow the organisation.   
The social enterprises interviewed agreed that in 
order to grow, they would need to improve their 
business management skills—they could not run 
the organisation on passion alone. However, they 
added that they were not able to spare the time 
and cash to attend courses. One social en-
trepreneur remarked that they were fortunate to 
have been assigned a mentor by a Japanese-
funded capacity building initiative. The assigned 
mentor provided advice for an extended period 
of two years. 
The double absence of effective business man-
agement practices and financial accountability 
could well be the reason why many social enter-
prises fail to scale after the start-up phase, when 
the patience and goodwill from supporters like 
donors, foundations and angel investors wears 
out.  
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V. List of Organisations Interviewed 
Ashoka Thaland. Bangkok, 13 March 2015. 
Changefusion. Singapore, 24 April 2015. 
Design for Social Innovation + Leadership. Bangkok, 11 March 2015. 
Dusit Thani Hotel. Bangkok, 20 January 2015. 
G-Lab, Social Innovation Lab. Bangkok, 12 March 2015. 
Lemon Farm. Bangkok, 11 March 2015. 
Local Alike. Bangkok, 11 March 2015. 
RADION International. Chiang Mai, 19 January 2015. 
Salforest. Bangkok, 11 March 2015. 
Thai Biomass. Bangkok, 11 March 2015. 
Thai Social Enterprise Office. Bangkok, 21 January & 13 March 2015. 
Thai Young Philanthropist Network. Bangkok, 12 March 2015. 
Thammasat University, School of Global Studies. Bangkok, 11 March 2015. 
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VI. Questions for Interviewees 
Organisational History  
1) How and why was your organisation established? Is there a founding story? 
2) For international organisations – Why did your organisation decide to enter Thailand?  
Operations  
3) On what projects are you currently working? What would success look like one year from 
now? Five years from now? 
4) How successful were your past programmes? What is your organisation doing differently 
from when it first began operations in Thailand? 
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Total Organisations Interviewed: 13 
SIO: 10 
 Nonprofits: 2 
 Social Enterprises: 4 
 Incubators: 4 
Government: 1 
Commercial: 1 
Media & Academia: 1 
ORGANISATIONS BY SECTOR
Media & Academia
1Commercial
1
Government
1
SIO
10
SIO SUB-SECTORS
Incubators
4
Social Ent.
4
Nonprofits
2
5) Do you foresee any upcoming difficulties?  
6) What does your organisation need to make your programmes more effective?  
Strategies  
7) What are your organisation’s goals for the next 3-5 years? How do you plan to meet those 
goals? 
8) What factors might jeopardise the success of your overall strategy?  
Collaboration  
9) Were there any difficulties or pitfalls in past collaborations? Have any difficulties surfaced in 
your current collaborations?  
10)  Have you collaborated with organisations outside your sector? How could such rela-
tionships be improved or facilitated?  
11) Is there any individual or organisation with whom you would like to collaborate but have 
been unable to do so?  
Human Resources  
12) Do you generally source staff locally or from overseas? Have you had any difficulties finding 
skilled local staff?  
13) Which professional skills, if any, do local staff currently lack? What do local staff need to 
succeed in today’s workplace?  
14) How would you evaluate local educational institutions in preparing future employees? Are 
there private or foreign institutions attempting to fill any gaps?  
Leadership  
15) What does effective leadership—in business, government or civil society—look like to you? 
16) What skills and resources do Thai leaders need to better serve their society?  
17) The Institute broadly defines societal leadership as “the practice of creating sustainable 
value and impact for the betterment of society within one’s sphere of influence.” Are there 
any remarkable individuals in Thailand whom you would consider a societal leader? 
Sustainability & CSR 
18) Does you organisation have any sustainability guidelines? How did you determine your 
current guidelines? 
19) Does your organisation engage in any Corporate Social Responsibility  (CSR) initiatives? 
Have you been able to measure the impact of your organisation’s CSR programmes? 
Funding (for civic-sector organisations) 
20) Roughly speaking, how is your organisation currently funded?  
21) How financially self-sustaining is your organisation at the moment? Do you have any plans 
to lower dependence on outside funding in the future? 
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Context  
22) How does working in Thailand differ from working in other Southeast Asian countries? 
What does Thailand have in common with the rest of the region?  
23) How do minorities (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) fit into the landscape? Do minorities 
actively collaborate with the status quo?  
24) Outside of your own organisation’s scope, what are the key problem areas facing Thailand?  
25) How does Thailand differ from five years ago? How do you imagine it will change in the 
next five years?  
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